Abstract. We consider collective choice problems where a group of agents has to decide on the location of a public facility in a Euclidean space. A well-known solution for such problems is the coordinatewise median of the reported votes and additional ®xed ballots. Instead of adding ballots, we extend the median solution by allowing set-valued outcomes. This especially applies for location problems with an even number of agents.
Introduction
Restrictions to the domain of single-peaked preferences have frequently been studied for public good models. Here we consider such restrictions for preferences on a Euclidean space. The public issue(s) to decide on are represented by points in a Euclidean space, leaving many interpretations open: locations for a public facility, budgetary constrained investment divisions among several public projects, bundles of public goods. We are interested in the following class of single-peaked preference relations: every agent has an individual best point and his preferences decline according to the distance to this best point. Because agents might weigh coordinates di¨erently, we assume that preferences are induced by separable-quadratic distance functions. A (collective) choice function assigns to each tuple of reported preference relations a singlevalued outcome, a compromise point. A central property in this paper is strategy-proofness. Strategy-proofness requires that no agent can bene®t by lying about his true preference relation. Well-known strategy-proof choice functions are median choice functions: for the one-dimensional case, at each preference pro®le the median of the reported best points is chosen, and for higher dimensions this method is extended by taking the median coordinatewise.
Median voting schemes were ®rst analyzed by Black (1948) for singlepeaked preferences. Moulin (1980) characterized all strategy-proof choice functions for one-dimensional Euclidean spaces when preferences are singlepeaked by median choice functions for which additional ®xed ballots are allowed. Berga and Serizawa (2000) consider maximal domains for rules that in addition to strategy-proofness satisfy the so-called no vetoer condition. Extensions of Moulin's (1980) results to higher-dimensional Euclidean spaces are provided by Barbera Á et al. (1993) and Border and Jordan (1983) . Similarly to Border and Jordan (1983) , we focus on the class of separable-quadratic preferences. For generalized median choice functions as considered by Moulin (1980) , Barbera Á et al. (1993), and Border and Jordan (1983) compromise points depend on the actual position of the ®xed ballots. If there is no external reason that determines the position of these ballots, then solving the location problem by generalized medians is as di½cult as the original problem itself. The determination of the ®xed ballots, which should then be left to the agents, is another collective choice problem. Moreover, for an even number of agents a problem for median choice functions arises when additional ®xed ballots are avoided. In that case, it is not clear how the median should be de®ned. If there is no unique median of all reported best points, then one possibility to de®ne the median is to choose both``median points''. In this paper, we de®ne the median as the closed interval between the two median points and consider so called choice correspondences, which assign sets of compromise points to every preference pro®le. For instance, the one-dimensional median choice correspondence yields the closed interval between the two median points, and for arbitrary dimensions the coordinatewise median correspondence yields the Cartesian product of these one-dimensional choice correspondences.
In this article, we study the well-known condition of strategy-proofness for choice correspondences. Similarly as before, strategy-proofness requires that lying is not pro®table for any agent. For single-valued choice functions this pro®tability is determined by an agent's individual preference relation. For set-valued choice correspondences this pro®tability is no longer straightforward. To extend strategy-proofness for choice functions to choice correspondences it is necessary to extend the``pointwise'' preference relations tò`s etwise'' preference relations, i.e., preference relations on the power set of compromise points. Assuming the existence of best and worst points in two sets A and B, A is weakly preferred to B if the best point in B is not better than that of A and the worst point in A is not worse than that of B. This type of relation on sets can be seen as an extension of approaches studied by Kannai and Peleg (1984) , Bossert (1989, ®nite subsets) , and Nehring and Puppe (1996, compact subsets) . Di¨erent approaches can be found in Ching and Zhou (1997) , Kelly (1977) , and Nitzan and Pattanaik (1984) . By virtue of these extended preferences, strategy-proofness is reformulated: unilateral devia-tions should yield sets of compromise points that are comparable and nonpro®table with respect to the extended preferences on subsets. As these preference relations are not complete, comparability is an essential condition.
Beside strategy-proofness we consider unanimity and two so-called newcomer conditions. Unanimity means that if all agents report the same preference relation, then the compromise point equals the unanimous best point. The newcomer conditions restrain the possible in¯uence of a new agent on the set of compromise points of a ®xed coalition N; these are the tie-breaking and the non-decisive newcomer condition. If a choice correspondence satis®es the tie-breaking newcomer condition, then an additional agent, who reports a preference relation with best point in the set of compromise points of coalition N, causes a reduction of this set of compromise points to his best point: he breaks the tie. The non-decisive newcomer condition requires that if an additional agent reports a preference relation with best point outside the set of compromise points of coalition N, then after joining this coalition the set of compromise points never reduces to his best point only. Alternatively we consider the weak non-decisive newcomer condition where we replace the set of compromise points with its convex hull: if an additional agent reports a preference relation with best point outside the convex hull of the set of compromise points of coalition N, then after joining this coalition the set of compromise points never reduces to his best point only. In this latter condition, the convex hull of the set of compromise points can be seen as an extended set of compromise points. The coordinatewise median correspondence is the only collective choice correspondence satisfying strategy-proofness, unanimity, the tie-breaking and the non-decisive newcomer condition. A stronger characterization result is obtained for the weak non-decisive newcomer condition: a collective choice correspondence satis®es strategy-proofness, unanimity, the tie-breaking and the weak non-decisive newcomer condition if and only if the convex hull of each compromise set it assigns equals the set of coordinatewise median compromise points.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Sect. 2 we introduce location problems and the``classical'' median choice functions. The restricted de®nition of the (coordinatewise) median choice function to odd numbers of agents leads to the setting for our further discussion. In Sect. 3 we skip the restriction on the number of agents for the median choice function by switching to set-valued choice correspondences. Now, the original model is adapted, preferences for sets are described and the four central conditions, strategyproofness, unanimity, the tie-breaking and the (weak) non-decisive newcomer condition, are introduced. In Sect. 4 we show that these four conditions imply a monotonicity property and a weak form of Pareto optimality. In Sect. 5 we characterize the set of all choice correspondences that satisfy strategyproofness, unanimity, the tie-breaking and the weak non-decisive newcomer condition. Furthermore, we show that the coordinatewise median correspondence is the only choice correspondence that satis®es strategy-proofness, unanimity, the tie-breaking and the non-decisive newcomer condition. Sect. 6 provides some comments on these results. First, we show that extending the set of preferences by non-separable single-peaked preferences yields incompatibility of the four central properties. Then, we discuss other extensions of preferences to subsets of the Euclidean space in relation to strategy-proofness. Finally, in Sect. 7, we discuss two closely related articles: Border and Jordan (1983) and Ching and Zhou (1997) .
Choice functions
A location problem is given by a ®nite set of agents N who have to agree on a location, or compromise point, in some Euclidean space E. Here we assume that E R M where M f1; . . . ; mg.1 Each agent i A N is equipped with a separable-quadratic preference relation pi over E. It is well-known that this boils down to the following: for each agent i A N there exists a weight vector di di 1 ; . . . ; di m A R M and a best point bi A E such that for all x; y A E, agent i weakly prefers x to y if and only if X
In the sequel we normalize the weight vector to length one. Note that every separable-quadratic preference relation is completely determined by a pair di; bi where
2 j 1, and bi A E. Let S denote the set of all separable-quadratic preference relations. For each agent i A N, we identify the preference relation pi A S with its characteristic pair di; bi and write pi di; bi A S. If at preference relation pi di; bi agent i weakly prefers x A E to y A E, then we denote this by x 7 pi y. Equivalently, we write x 7 di; bi y. Strict preference is denoted by x 1 pi y, i.e., x 7 pi y and not y 7 pi x, and indi¨erence by x @ pi y, i.e., x 7 pi y and y 7 pi x. Equivalently, we write x 1 di; bi y and x @ di; bi y.
It is easy to check that all separable-quadratic preference relations are single-peaked, i.e., for pi A S there exists a best point, or peak, bi A E such that for all x A E, x 0 bi, and all 0 < l < 1, bi 1 pi lbi 1 À lx 1 pi x. A geometric implication of pi A S being separable-quadratic is that the corresponding indi¨erence sets are ellipsoids around the best point bi with main diagonals parallel to the coordinate axes. The closer these ellipsoids are to bi the better the points on it are.
By S N we denote the set of all (preference) pro®les p h pii i A N such that for all i A N, pi A S. A (collective) choice function j is a function that assigns to every pro®le p A S N a point jp in E. This point is called the compromise point. A choice function that only depends on the peaks of the preference pro®les and disregards the underlying preference relations satis®es 1 By R we denote the set of real numbers, R 1 fx A R j x b 0g, and R 1 fx A R j x > 0g. By R M we denote the Cartesian product of jMj copies of R, indexed by the elements of M; R M and R M are de®ned similarly. peak-onliness.2 Choice functions that satisfy peak-onliness are called voting schemes.
Note that the agents' preference relations are private information. Still we would like to ®nd the compromise point on basis of``correct information''. Therefore, the ®rst property of choice functions we are interested in is strategy-proofness: no agent ever bene®ts from misrepresenting his preference relation.3 Before we formulate its de®nition, we introduce some notation.
Let p; q A S N and q 0 S J N. The restriction of pro®le p to S is denoted by p S A S S . We write p S q if p S q S . For ®nite sets X ; Y , jX j denotes the cardinality of X and X nY 1 fx A X j x B Y g.
Strategy-proofness.
A choice function j is strategy-proof if for all i A N and all pro®les p; q A S N with p Nnfig q,
For one-dimensional location problems with an odd number of agents it is easy to see that taking the median of all reported points is a well-de®ned and strategy-proof voting scheme; see for example Moulin (1980) . The de®nition of the median we state here is well-de®ned for arbitrary ®nite numbers of agents and coincides with the``classical'' median whenever it exists. We de®ne the median of a ®nite set V H R by
If jV j is odd, then medV is a singleton. If jV j is even, then medV is either a singleton or a closed interval. For higher dimensional location problems in E with an odd number of agents, applying the median coordinatewise yields the following well-de®ned choice function.
The coordinatewise median choice function. Let N be such that jNj is odd. For all p hdi; bii i A N A S N , the coordinatewise median choice function is de®ned by j med p x such that for all j A M; x j medfbi j ji A Ng:
Note that the coordinatewise median choice function is strategy-proof; see for example Border and Jordan (1983) . Because the coordinatewise median choice function only depends on the individual best points, we also refer to it as to the coordinatewise median voting scheme.
2 A choice function j is peak-only if for all p hdi;
3 In game theoretical terms, a choice function is strategy-proof if in the direct revelation game form it is a weakly dominant strategy for each agent to announce his true preference relation.
Choice correspondences
Since later on we also admit variations of the set of agents, we consider a set of potential agents denoted by N. By N we denote the class of non-empty and ®nite subsets of N. We call N A N a coalition. A (collective) choice correspondence c is a function that assigns to every coalition N A N and every pro®le p A S N a subset c N p of E. We call c N p the set of compromise points.4 Choice correspondences that satisfy peak-onliness are called voting correspondences.
Because the set of compromise points assigned by a choice correspondence might generically be empty, we formulate the following property. The next conditions we introduce describe the in¯uence of an additional agent, a``newcomer'', on the set of compromise points. Let c be a choice correspondence, N be a coalition, and p be a pro®le in S N . Then we can interpret the set of compromise points c N p as the set of alternatives among which coalition N is unable to make any further restriction. In some sense, according to N, all compromise points in c N p are equally good. Now, consider a newcomer k B N who joins N at pro®le p and reports preference relation pk A S with best point bk contained in the set of compromise points c N p. Then agent k is in favor of point bk whereas N is indi¨erent between all compromise points in c N p. If the choice correspondence satis®es the tie-breaking newcomer condition, then agent k breaks the tie in favor of his best point.
Let N A N, k B N, p A S N , and pk dk; bk A S. Then, h p; pki A S N Wfkg denotes the pro®le where each agent i A N reports pi and agent k reports pk. With some abuse of notation we write c N Wfkg p; pk instead of c N Wfkg h p; pki.
4 For convenience, we will identify any choice function j on S N with a (N-voting) correspondence j N by identifying compromise points with singleton compromise sets:
Tie-breaking newcomer condition. A choice correspondence c is tiebreaking for newcomers if for all N A N, all p A S N , and all k B N with pk dk; bk, Young (1974 Young ( , 1975 introduced a stronger condition to characterize score rules, called consistency, which implies the tie-breaking newcomer condition. Young's consistency notion requires the following. Let N; N H A N be disjoint, p A S N , and p
H . The non-decisive newcomer condition discussed next limits the decisiveness of newcomers and implies non-dictatorship. Consider the situation described above with one di¨erence, namely that the newcomer k B N who joins N at pro®le p reports a preference relation pk A S with best point bk not contained in the set of compromise points c N p. Then the non-decisive newcomer condition requires that the set of compromise points is not reduced to the best point bk of agent k's reported preference relation. Hence, the newcomer k is not decisive.
Non-decisive newcomer condition. A choice correspondence c is non-decisive for newcomers if for all N A N, all p A S N , and all k B N with pk dk; bk,
A weakening of the non-decisive newcomer condition is the following weak non-decisive newcomer condition where a newcomer k B N who joins N at pro®le p and reports a preference relation pk A S with best point bk not contained in the convex hull convc N p of the set of compromise points c N p is not decisive. Here, we interpret convc N p as an extended set of compromise points.
Weak non-decisive newcomer condition. A choice correspondence c is weakly non-decisive for newcomers if for all N A N, all p A S N , and all k B N with pk dk; bk,
In the sequel we often use the contrapositive of the latter implication:
It is easy to check that the non-decisive newcomer condition implies the weak non-decisive newcomer condition. Note that for convex valued choice correspondences the weak non-decisive newcomer condition coincides with the nondecisive newcomer condition.
Finally, we extend strategy-proofness, already de®ned for choice functions, to correspondences. Again, strategy-proofness should guarantee that no agent ever bene®ts from misrepresenting his preferences. Given a choice function, it is clear that an agent can only bene®t from lying if he strictly prefers the compromise point when lying to the compromise point when telling the truth. Given a choice correspondences, agents have to compare sets of compromise points in order to evaluate possible bene®ts from lying. Hence, in order to de®ne strategy-proofness, we need to extend the agents' preference relations on E to preference relations on the power set of E, denoted by 2 E . Several of these extensions are studied in the literature (see our references later on). Here, we focus on one of these possible extensions. However, as we will explain in Sect. 6, this choice is not arbitrary and our results depend very much on this speci®c extension. In words, we say that an agent with best point b and weight vector d weakly prefers X to Y if for every point in Y there exists a point in X which is at least as good for him and for each point in X there is a point in Y which is at least as bad for him. If X and Y are compact sets of compromise points, then an agent with best point b and weight vector d weakly prefers his best points in X to his best points in Y. Furthermore, he weakly prefers his worst points in X to his worst points in Y.5 Hence, for points x; y A E it follows that x 7 d; b y if and only if fxg 7 d; b fyg. In this sense the relation``7 d; b on E'' is extended to a relation``7 d; b on 2 E ''. The extension of a preference relation on a set to its power set we propose here generalizes extensions analyzed in Kannai and Peleg (1984) , Barbera Á et al. (1984) , Bossert (1989) , and Nehring and Puppe (1996) . Kannai and Peleg (1984) discuss an extension of a linear order on a ®nite set by comparisons of best and worst points. Bossert (1989) provided an axiomatic characterization of this extension. For ®nite subsets of E our extension coincides with those discussed in Kannai and Peleg (1984) , Barbera Á et al. (1984) , and Bossert (1989) . Nehring and Puppe (1996) study an extension of preferences on E to compact subsets of E. Their extension coincides with our 7 d; b on these compact subsets.
It is easy to see that any preference relation 7 d; b on 2 E , de®ned by d; b A S, is re¯exive but need not be complete (e.g., for the closed intervals X 0; 3, Y 1; 2, neither X 7 d; 0 Y nor Y 7 d; 0 X ). Furthermore, by the de®nition of 7 d; b on E and transitivity of a, transitivity of 7 d; b on 2 E follows easily. Now, similarly as before, we can formalize strategy-proofness for choice correspondences.
Strategy-proofness. A choice correspondence c is strategy-proof if for all N A N, all i A N, and all p; q A S N with p Nnfig q,
Note that our notion of strategy-proofness also contains the requirement that the sets of compromise points before and after any unilateral deviation are comparable. The following lemma is an immediate consequence of strategy-proofness and unanimity. Lemma 1. Let the choice correspondence c satisfy unanimity and strategyproof-ness. Then c is nonempty.
Proof. Let N A N and assume, without loss of generality, that N f1; . . . ; ng. Let p d; b N be a unanimous pro®le. By unanimity, c N p 0 q. We have to show that for all q A S N , c N q 0 q. Let q hq1; . . . ; qni and for l A f0; . . . ; ng, q l 1 hq1; . . . ; ql; pl 1; . . . ; pni. Note that q 0 p and q n q. For l 1 it follows that p Nnf1g q 1 . Hence, by strategy-proofness,
In situations where all agents of a subcoalition report the same preference pro®le, strategy-proofness can be adapted as follows. Intermediate strategyproofness requires that unanimous subcoalitions cannot gain by strategic behavior. 
The following lemma corresponds to a result for voting schemes; see Peters et al. (1992) , Lemma 2.4.
Lemma 2. A choice correspondence c is strategy-proof if and only if it is intermediate strategy-proof.
Proof. By de®nition, intermediate strategy-proofness implies strategyproofness.
In the remainder of the proof we show that strategy-proofness implies intermediate strategy-proofness. Let N A N and S J N. Assume, without loss of generality, that N f1; . . . ; ng and S f1; . . . ; sg. Furthermore, let d; b A S, p; q A S N with p NnS q and p S d; b S . We prove that Hence, by strategy-proofness, c N q
A choice correspondence that satis®es all conditions for choice correspondences we introduced in this section is the coordinatewise median correspondence. It assigns to each preference pro®le the Cartesian product of the coordinatewise medians.
The coordinatewise median correspondence. For all N A N and all p hdi; bii i A N A S N the coordinatewise median correspondence c med is de®ned by
Note that although the coordinatewise median correspondence is de®ned as choice correspondence, we can also interpret it as a voting correspondence that only depend on the peaks of the reported pro®les.
Lemma 3. The coordinatewise median correspondence c med satis®es unanimity, strategy-proofness, the tie-breaking and the non-decisive newcomer condition.
The straightforward proof of Lemma 3 is left to the reader.
Monotonicity and coordinatewise Pareto optimality
In this section we show that choice correspondences that are unanimous, strategy-proof, tie-breaking and weakly non-decisive for newcomers satisfy a monotonicity condition and a weak form of Pareto optimality. Furthermore, we show that the correspondence that associates with each set of compromise points the smallest closed set of compromise points inherits unanimity, strategy-proofness, the tie-breaking and the weak non-decisive newcomer condition from the original correspondence.
First, we discuss monotonicity. The monotonicity condition we introduce here resembles the well-known strong positive association introduced by Muller and Satterthwaite (1977) . Loosely speaking, monotonicity requires the following. Consider p; q A S N and x A E. If c N p fxg and for all agents i in N, x``improves'' by going from pro®le p to pro®le q, then c N q fxg. In order to formalize monotonicity, we introduce some notation.
Let i A N, pi di; bi A S, and x A E. The weak upper contour set of pi at x, denoted by Cx; pi, equals the set of all y A E such that y 7 pi x. So, Cx; pi is the ellipsoid, with centre bi and weight vector di through x, plus its interior:
The strict upper contour set of pi at x, denoted by C x; pi, equals the set of all y A E such that y 1 pi x. So, C x; pi is the interior of Cx; pi:
For a ®nite set V we de®ne the box of V by boxV 1
Now consider bi A boxfbi; xg such that for all j A M, bi j x j only if bi j x j . For each such bi there is a vector of weights di such that at x the elliptic boundaries of the weak upper contour sets of pi di; bi and pi di; bi are tangent to each other and Cx; pi J Cx; pi. So, if bi 0 bi, then Cx; pinfxg J C x; pi. Note that going from pi to pi location x improves, i.e., for all y A E, x 7 pi y implies x 7 pi y.
Summarizing, we say that pi di; bi A S is an x-improvement of pi di; bi A S if . bi A boxfbi; xg is such that for all j A M, bi j x j only if bi j x j and . di is a weight vector such that the ellipsoid with centre bi and weight vector di is tangent at x to the ellipsoid with centre bi and weight vector di.
Lemma 4. Let the choice correspondence c satisfy strategy-proofness, unanimity, the tie-breaking and the weak non-decisive newcomer condition. Then,
(ii) for all x A E and all p hdi; bii i A N , p hdi; bii i A N A S N such that for all i A N, either pi pi or pi is an x-improvement of pi,
Proof. Let N A N, x A E, and p hdi; bii i A N , p hdi; bii i A N A S N be such that for all i A N, either pi pi or pi is an x-improvement of pi. By (3), c N p X C x; pi q and c N p J Cx; pi. Hence, by nonemptiness (Lemma 1) and (2), c N p fxg.
(ii) We have to prove that Border and Jordan (1983) and Peters et al. (1992) show that there exist no strategy-proof, anonymous, and Pareto optimal choice functions when the number of agents is even. For choice correspondences this incompatibility does not hold. The coordinatewise median correspondence is Pareto optimal in terms of the extended preferences even if the number of agents is even.9
Now we prove that a choice correspondence c satisfying strategyproofness, unanimity, and both newcomer conditions is coordinatewise Pareto optimal. The proof is by induction on the number of di¨erent preference relations at a pro®le. For p A S N we denote this number by mp 1 jf pi j i A Ngj.
8 As usual, a set of compromise points is Pareto optimal if there exists no other set of compromise points such that all agents are weakly better o¨and at least one agent is strictly better o¨.
Both, the choice of the preferences and the choice for set-valued outcomes makes it di½cult to ®nd a (simple) description of all Pareto optimal sets of compromise points. Su½cient conditions for Pareto optimality strongly depend on the weight vectors of the individual preferences. 9 Note that a set that is Pareto optimal in terms of the extended preferences might contain compromise points that are itself not Pareto optimal in terms of the original (``pointwise'') preferences on E.
Lemma 5. Let the choice correspondence c satisfy strategy-proofness, unanimity, the tie-breaking and the weak non-decisive newcomer condition. Then c is coordinatewise Pareto optimal.
Proof. Since c is nonempty (Lemma 1), for all p A S N , cp 0 q. By induction on k A N we prove that for all N A N and all p hdi;
Induction basis. k 1. If m p 1, then p is a unanimous pro®le. We are done by unanimity.
Induction hypothesis. For all N A N and all p hdi;
Let N A N and p hdi; bii i A N A S N be such that m p k 1. Suppose, by contradiction, that c N p P boxfbi j i A Ng. Since k b 1 it follows that mp b 2. Let T 1 ; T 2 ; . . . ; T k1 be the partition of N in subcoalitions such that in each subcoalition T l , l A f1; . . . ; k 1g, all members have the same preference relation at p. Because c N p P boxfbi j i A Ng, there exists x A c N p and j A M such that either for all i A N, x j < bi j or for all i A N, x j > bi j . We assume, without loss of generality, that for all i A N, x j < bi j and T 1 f1; 2; . . . ; tg.
Let y A C x; p1 such that for all m A Mnf jg, x m y m and x j < y j < min i A N bi j . Because C x; p1 is an open set there is an open e-neighborhood around y, say N e y fz A E j P j A M z j À y j 2 < e 2 g, such that N e y J C x; p1. Let e e jMj . Then for all i A N, there exists bi A boxfx; big X N e y such that for all l A M, bi l x l only if bi l x l . Note that boxfbi j i A Ng J N e y. For all l A f1; . . . ; k 1g and all i 1 ; i 2 A T l , bi 1 bi 2 . Hence, without loss of generality, for all l A f1; . . . ; k 1g and all i 1 ; i 2 A T l , bi 1 bi 2 . Now consider p A S N such that for all i A T 1 , pi pi and for all i A NnT 1 , pi di; bi such that either pi pi or pi is an x-improvement of pi. Since x A c N p, by Lemma 4 (ii), x A convc N p. Thus, by x B C x; p1 and the convexity of C x; p1 it follows that there exists x A c N p such that x B C x; p1. Let s A T 2 , which exists because m p b 2. Consider q A S N such that for all i A T 1 and s A T 2 , qi ps and q NnT 1 p. Note that by construction, mp a k 1 and mq a k. Therefore, by the induction hypothesis (4), c N q J boxfbi j i A NnT 1 g. Thus, c N q J N e y J C x; p1. Hence, for all z A c N q, z 1 p1 x. Next, recall that for all i A T 1 , pi p1, qi ps, and p NnT 1 q. So, by intermediate strategy-proofness, c N p 7 p1 c N q. Thus, there exists z A c N q such that x 7 p1 z. This yields the desired contradiction. r Finally, we de®ne the closure c of any correspondence c. Note that for any subset X of E, the set X denotes the closure of X (with respect to the standard Euclidean topology). Thus, X is the smallest closed set in E that contains X.
Closure of
Lemma 6. Let the choice correspondence c satisfy strategy-proofness, unanimity, the tie-breaking and the (weak) non-decisive newcomer condition. Then c also satis®es strategy-proofness, unanimity, the tie-breaking and the (weak) non-decisive newcomer condition.
Proof. It follows easily that c satis®es unanimity and the (weak) non-decisive newcomer condition.
Strategy-proofness. Let N A N, i A N, and p; q A S N be such that p Nnfig q. We have to show that c N p 7 pi c N q, i.e., (i) for all x A c N p there exist y A c N q such that x 7 pi y and (ii) for all y A c N q there exist x A c N p such that x 7 pi y.
Lemma 5, c N is coordinatewise Pareto optimal. Hence, for q hdi; bii i A N , c N q J boxfbi j i A Ng. Since boxfbi j i A Ng is a compact set, it is without loss of generality to assume that fy l g l A N converges to a point y A c N q. Since 7 pi is a continuous preference relation, x l 7 pi y l for all l A N implies x 7 pi y. Hence, for all x A c N p there exist y A c N q such that x 7 pi y. The proof of (ii) is similarly.
Tie-Breaking newcomer condition. Let N A N, p A S N , and k B N be such that pk dk; bk and bk A c N p. We have to show that c N Wfkg p; pk fbkg. Because c N p is the closure of c N p, there exists a sequence fx l g l A N in c N p that converges to bk. For all l A N, let pk l dk l ; bk l be such that bk l x l . By the tie-breaking newcomer condition of c, for all l A N, c N Wfkg p; pk l fx l g. So, for all l A N, c N Wfkg p; pk l fx l g. Because fx l g l A N converges to bk, it follows by strategy-proofness of c that c N Wfkg p; pk fbkg. r
Two characterization results
The main objective of this section is to characterize the class of choice correspondences that satisfy strategy-proofness, unanimity, the tie-breaking and the weak non-decisive newcomer condition. We prove that the convex and closed hull of any choice correspondence that satis®es all properties mentioned above equals the median choice correspondence (Theorem 1). Furthermore, if the weak non-decisive newcomer condition is strengthened to the non-decisive newcomer condition, then the median choice correspondence is the only correspondence satisfying all the properties (Theorem 2). Throughout this section we assume that c and c (Lemma 6) are choice correspondence that satis®es all properties mentioned above. Hence, by Lemmas 1, 4, and 5, c and c satisfy nonemptiness, monotonicity, and coordinatewise Pareto optimality.
Let x be a compromise point of c at pro®le p A S N and j A M. First we prove that the number of agents reporting a best point at p with its j th coordinate strictly smaller than that of x is smaller than, or equal to, half of the number of agents at p. A similar result holds for the number of agents reporting a peak with its j th coordinate strictly greater than that of x. From this and nonemptiness it is obvious that for any location problem with an odd number of agents the compromise point is the unique coordinatewise median of the reported best points. Applying the two newcomer conditions then yields that this holds for the convex hull of the set of compromise points at any location problem with an even number of agents. The proof of the ®rst two steps is by induction on mp, the number of di¨erent preference relations reported at a pro®le p. The induction step when mp 2 di¨ers from all the other steps, therefore it is treated separately in the following two lemmas.
In Lemma 7 we proof the induction step m p 2 in the special case where the reported peaks at p are on a line parallel to one of the axis. In Lemma 8 the result is generalized to arbitrary pro®les p with mp 2. Now we are able to prove that the number of agents who are reporting a peak with its j th coordinate strictly smaller (greater) than that of a compromise point x is bounded by half of the number of agents that are present.
For j A M, N A N, p hdi; bii A S N , and x A E de®ne L j; x; p 1 fi A N j bi j < x j g; I j; x; p 1 fi A N j bi j x j g;
Lemma 9. Let the choice correspondence c satisfy strategy-proofness, unanimity, the tie-breaking and the weak non-decisive newcomer condition. Let e e jMj . Then for all l A f2; . . . kg, there exists
Now consider q A S N such that q T 1 WT k1 q and for l A f2; . . . ; kg, i A T l , qi d l ; b l such that either qi qi or qi is an x-improvement of qi. Now, by monotonicity, c N q; d; x fxg. Note that mq a mq a k 1 and L j; x; q L j; x; q L j; x; p. Thus, jL j; x; qj > 
Remark 1. Note that c med is a voting correspondence. So, by Theorem 1 it follows that the four characterizing conditions imply peak-onliness.
The following example demonstrates that the non-decisive newcomer condition is not implied by strategy-proofness, unanimity, the tie-breaking and the weak non-decisive newcomer condition. Example 1. For simplicity, assume that E R. Then the choice correspondencec is de®ned as follows. For all N A N and all p hdi;
Is is easy to check thatc satis®es strategy-proofness, unanimity, the tie-breaking and the weak non-decisive newcomer condition, but not the non-decisive newcomer condition.
Theorem 2. A choice correspondence c satis®es strategy-proofness, unanimity, the tie-breaking and the non-decisive newcomer condition if and only if c is the coordinatewise median correspondence c med .
Loosely speaking, the di¨erence between Theorem 1 and 2 is that compromise sets assigned by choice correspondences satisfying the conditions in Theorem 1 can have``holes'': as long as the convex hull of each compromise set is equal to the compromise set assigned by the coordinatewise median correspondence all properties will be satis®ed (and all agents are in fact indi¨erent between the compromise set with the hole(s) and the convex hull that equals the coordinatewise median correspondence compromise set).
Proof. By Lemma 3, the coordinatewise median correspondence c med satis®es the properties mentioned in the theorem. The following list of examples shows that unanimity, strategy-proofness, the tie-breaking newcomer condition, and the non-decisive newcomer condition are logically independent from each other. 
The mean voting correspondence c mean satis®es unanimity, the tie-breaking and the non-decisive newcomer condition, but it is not strategy-proof. t
Example 4. The box voting correspondence c box is de®ned as follows. For all N A N and all p hdi;
The voting correspondence c box satis®es unanimity, strategy-proofness, and the non-decisive newcomer condition, but it does not satisfy the tie-breaking newcomer condition. t
As we will also discuss in Sect. 7, the results presented here and those of Border and Jordan (1983) are logically independent. The following example not only shows the independence of the non-decisive newcomer property, it also proves that unanimity, strategy-proofness, and the tie-breaking newcomer condition do not imply peak-onliness. In Border and Jordan (1983) peakonliness is implied by unanimity, strategy-proofness, and single-valuedness. So, the example shows that unanimity, strategy-proofness, and set-valuedness are weaker than the properties studied by Border and Jordan (1983) . 
< :
It is obvious that F does neither satisfy peak-onliness, nor the weak non-decisive newcomer condition. Furthermore, it is straightforward to prove that F satis®es unanimity and the tie-breaking newcomer condition. To see that F is strategy-proof notice that for each agent i A N, the best and worst points of c N med p are on the boundary of c N med p. t
Robustness of the results
We consider the robustness of our results with respect to changes in the set of admissible preference relations. This is done in two ways. First, we determine a maximal domain of single-peaked preferences for Theorems 1 and 2. Then we discuss the extension of preferences over compromise points to preferences over sets of compromise points. First, we consider greater sets of admissible preferences. Let D be a set of single-peaked, strictly convex preferences (i.e., all weak upper contour sets are strictly convex) such that S J D. We prove that there exists a choice correspondence that satis®es strategy-proofness, unanimity, the tie-breaking and the weak non-decisive newcomer condition if and only if all preferences 7 in D have the box property10, i.e., for all x; y A E and 7 with best point, or peak, b A E, y A boxx; b implies y 7 x. Note that many single-peaked preference relations have this property, e.g., all separable-quadratic preference relations and all preference relations that are based on one of the following L 1 ; L 2 ; . . . ; L y norms: for k A N, x is weakly preferred to y with respect to L k , x 7 L k y, if and only if
Of course, there are also single-peaked preferences which do not have the box property. Take for instance preference relations with ellipsoid indi¨erence sets such that the main diagonals are not parallel to the axes of E. The box property is essential for having choice correspondences satisfying the four properties in Theorems 1 or 2. The addition of one single-peaked preference to S that does not have the box property causes non-existence of these choice correspondences. It is straightforward to prove that c med is strategy-proof, if all preference relations have the box property. Furthermore, c med satis®es unanimity, the tiebreaking and the weak non-decisive newcomer condition.
(i) Only if part. If there exists a choice correspondence c satisfying strategyproofness, unanimity, the tie-breaking and the weak non-decisive newcomer condition, then all preference relations in D have the box property.
Suppose, by contradiction, that c satis®es all properties named above and there exists a preference relation q1 A D that does not have the box property. Then there exists x; y A E such that y A boxfx; bg and x 1 q1 y. Call such a pair x; y A E Â E a box violation at q1. Let sx; b denote the number of coordinates on which x and b di¨er. Note that because q1 is single-peaked, sx; b 0 1 (otherwise y lx 1 À lb for some l A 0; 1 and by singlepeakedness, y 1 q1 x). Hence, sx; b b 2.
We prove that there exists a box violation x; y A E Â E at q1 such that sx; b < sx; b. Applying this result iteratively yields a box violation, say x;ỹ, such that sx; b a 1. Hence, we have a contradiction and are done.
Consider the line through x and y, denoted by linex; y 1 fx lx À y j l A Rg. There exists a point y A linex; y on the boundary of boxfx; bg and a coordinate j such that y j b j and y j 0 x j . Since x 1 q1 y, strict convexity implies that x 1 q1 y: 8
Next, let N f1; 2; 3g, d; x; d; y A S, and p hd; x; d; yi A S f2; 3g . Denote byc the restriction of c to 6Ñ AN SÑ. Clearly,c satis®es strategy-11 A referee suggested that it may be possible to drop the requirement of single-peakedness in Theorem 3 by using a similar argument as Berga and Serizawa (2000) , Corollary 2. One of the necessary adjustments of Theorem 3 would be to extend the median correspondence to deal with strictly increasing preferences. We leave it an open problem whether or not this can be done. 12 Replace S by D in the previous de®nitions of conditions. proofness, unanimity, the tie-breaking and the weak non-decisive newcomer condition. Hence, by Theorem 1, for allÑ A N and p A SÑ, convcÑ p cÑ med p. 10 Because x A boxfx; yg and y A boxfx; bg, it follows that y A boxfx; bg: 11
Because by (8), x 1 q1 y and x is the best point of q1 in boxfx; yg, it follows that
Now, (10), (11), and (12) imply that x; y is a box violation such that sx; b < sx; b. This completes the proof of (i).
(ii) Assume that all preferences in D have the box property and that c satis®es all properties named above. We have to prove that for all N A N and
The proof is by induction on the number of agents that report a preference relation in DnS. For p A D N we denote this number by l p 1 jfi A N j pi A DnSgj. N such that q Nnf1g p and q1 d1; b1 A S. Note that lq lp À 1 k. Thus, by the induction hypothesis (13), c N q c N med q fzg. By strategy-proofness, z 7 q1 x and x 7 p1 z. Since d1 was chosen arbitrarily and q1 is strictly convex, there must exist j A M such that x j < b1 j a z j . 
The proof that for all p A D N such that l p k 1, c N p K c N med p is similar to the proof of the same statement at the end of the proof of Theorem 1. r
As mentioned before the results presented here very much depend on the actual extension of preferences over compromise points to preferences over sets of compromise points. Other extensions di¨ering from those discussed here might either lead to impossibilities, if the extension implies a stronger notion of strategy-proofness, or they might lead to indeterminability, if the extension implies a weaker notion of strategy-proofness. We will explain both cases by the following examples.
First, we discuss two extensions that yield stronger notions of strategyproofness and incompatibility with unanimity, the tie-breaking and the nondecisive newcomer condition. 
Then for an agent with preference u , unanimity, the tie-breaking and the non-decisive newcomer condition. Since c 1=2 p may be empty, it is not strategy-proof with respect to 7 d; b . The choice correspondence c 1=2 can be extended to higher dimensional E by taking any partition of E into two convex parts. t
Example 11. A choice correspondence that satis®es all conditions mentioned above, but that it is not a subsolution of c med is de®ned as follows. Let a; b A E. By squarefa; bg we denote the union of fa; bg and the interior of boxfa; bg. It is straightforward to prove that c N square satis®es unanimity and the two newcomer conditions. Strategy-proofness with respect to u 4 d; b follows from the following observations. The set of compromise points c N square p is convex. Hence, its cardinality is either zero, one, or in®nity. In case of cardinality one, either all agents have an unanimous best point or there is an agent l with best point bl on the unique compromise point. Only he is able to change this singleton set of compromise points by a unilateral deviation either to the empty set or to another singleton set. Obviously, he cannot gain by doing so. Strategy-proofness with respect to u 3 d; b is also straightforward, although cumbersome to prove. t
Concluding discussion
Border and Jordan (1983) consider the location problem as described in Sect. 2: a group of agents has to choose exactly one compromise point in a higher dimensional Euclidean space based on the agents' separable-quadratic preferences on this space. One of the results for this model is a characterization of median choice functions with additional ®xed ballots, or generalized median choice functions, by unanimity and strategy-proofness. One of the by-products of the characterization is that unanimity and strategy-proofness imply peak-onliness. Border and Jordan's (1983) result for choice rules and our result for choice correspondences seem to be very similar. Indeed by taking appropriate additional ®xed ballots, the corresponding generalized median choice function yields a corner point of the set of compromise points assigned by the coordinatewise median correspondence. So, for special ®xed ballots, generalized median choice functions are strict subcorrespondences of the coordinatewise median correspondence. But at other sets of ballots, especially non-in®nite ones, non-median compromise points may be determined by generalized median choice functions, i.e., such points are not in the set of compromise points of the coordinatewise median correspondence. This shows that the results presented here and those in Borda and Jordan (1983) are no simple consequences of each other.
Due to the possibility of set-valued outcomes, strategy-proofness for choice correspondences is signi®cantly weaker than for choice rules. The following will illustrate this. For choice rules, unanimity and strategy-proofness imply peak-onliness. In Sect. 6, Example 5 shows that a similar result does not hold for choice correspondences even if additionally the tie-breaking newcomer condition is imposed. Because generalized median choice functions do not satisfy the non-decisive newcomer condition13 and because of the relatively weakness of strategy-proofness it seems rather di½cult to utilize the results of Border and Jordan (1983) in our setting. We did not succeed in this. Though globally their proof structure resembles ours, the various (local) steps are proved quite di¨erently.
We end the comparison of both models by stressing one similarity: the chosen subset of single-peaked preferences. In both papers the indi¨erence sets are ellipsoids with main diagonals parallel to the axes of the Euclidean space. Allowing for preferences with elliptical indi¨erence curves such that the main diagonals are not parallel to these axes, yields in Borda and Jordan (1983) setting dictatorship and in our model an impossibility; see Sect. 6. So, restricting the set of admissible preferences to the set of separable-quadratic preferences is essential in both models.
Finally, we brie¯y discuss a recent article by Ching and Zhou (1997) . They consider a more general choice model with an arbitrary set of alternatives and a general domain of preferences. Similar to our approach, Ching and Zhou (1997) focus on choice correspondences rather than choice functions. The strategy-proofness condition they consider is based on the extension of preferences to the powerset of the set of compromise points we discuss in Example 7. For this more general model, Ching and Zhou (1997) prove two GibbardSatterthwaite results, one for general preferences and one for continuous preferences. As already mentioned in Sect. 6, the strategy-proofness condition 13 Note that only speci®c generalized median choice functions are de®ned for the variable population model in a straightforward way; e.g., coordinatewise staus quo choice functions.
at hand is rather strong. Therefore, it is not a surprise that we obtain a similar incompatibility result (see Example 7) in our model with single-peaked preferences.
